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THE PUBLIC EMPLOYEE AND HIS GOVERNMENT:
CONDITIONS AND DISABILITIES OF PUBLIC EMPLOYMENT
JEROME J. SHESTACK*

Even before Mr. Marbury, the public employee and his government
have frequently found themselves on opposite sides of the counsel
table. Not that public employees are a particularly litigious lot. Faced,
however, with the willingness of administrators to deal with them
politically and the unwillingness of legislators to protect them adequately, their resort to the courts was inevitable. But the courts also
often provided inadequate protection. Decisions which combined
ancient concepts with more than a touch of political realism accorded
scant recognition to the substantial interests of the ever-growing number of public employees.
In recent years, the traditional cliches in at least two areas of the
law of officers and employees appear to have undergone if not an
agonizing, at least a searching, reappraisal. These areas, the subject
of this paper, are: first, the constitutionality of conditions of public
employment, such as restrictions against political activity, invoking the
privilege against self-incrimination and joining certain organizations;
and, second, union activity by public employees.
I. CONDITIONS OF PUBLIc EMPLOYMENT

The recent rash of loyalty oath legislation' brought into focus more
sharply than ever before the question of the constitutionality of conditions of public employment. The aftermath of this legislation has
been a series of decisions by the Supreme Court which, for the first
time, enunciate principles that will undoubtedly limit the extent to
which local, state and federal governments may control the activities
of their employees.
For a long time courts had assumed that conditions of public employment were not subject to the guarantees of the First, Fifth and
Fourteenth Amendments. 2 This belief stemmed from the "premise"
* First Deputy City Solicitor, Philadelphia, 1953-55. Associated with
Schnader, Harrison, Segal &Lewis, Philadelphia, Pa.
1. See GELLHORN, THE STATES AND SUBVERSION App. A, p. 393 (1952), describing the types of state statutes relating to subversive activities; Appendix B at
p. 414 lists the statutes by states.
2. The discussion here is limited to the guarantees of speech, religion, assembly and due process contained in the .First,-Fifth and FQurteenth Amendments. Particular conditions of employment have also been challenged as contrary to bills of attainder and ex post facto laws: Cummings v. Missouri, 4 Wall.
333 (U.S. 1867); United States v. Lovett, 328 U.S. 303 (1946); Garner v. Board
of Public Works of Los Angeles, 341 U.S. 716, 731 (1951) (dissenting opinion
by Mr. Justice Douglas). Important objections have also involved conflict with
an oath prescribed by state constitution: Imbrie v. Marsh, 3 N.J. 578, 71 A.2d
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that government employment is not a right, but a privilege which
may be granted, modified or revoked at the will of the sovereign. 3
Hence, the state might attach whatever conditions it wished to the
privilege and if the employee did not choose to conform to the conditions, he could resign.
Most frequently cited for this proposition was McAuliffe v. New
Bedford.4 In that instance, a policeman was removed for violating
a regulation prohibiting any member of the police department from
soliciting money for political purposes or serving as a member of a
political committee. It was contended that the regulation was invalid
as invading the petitioner's right to express his political opinion. In
disposing of this contention, Judge (later Mr. Justice) Holmes said:
"The petitioner may have a constitutional right to talk politics but he
has no constitutional right to be a policeman." 4a
Struck by this epigrammatic phrase, courts invoked it frequently when
the constitutionality of conditions of public employment was challenged.5 Taken to its logical conclusion, the McAuliffe phrase would
mean that no matter how unreasonable or arbitrary the conditions
of employment, an employee could not complain of their unconstitutionality since he has the option of leaving both the employment and
the conditions.
Apparently, however, the courts never carried Holmes' statement to
its extreme implications. Inconsistently, it was assumed that conditions of employment must be reasonable. Thus, in disposing of attacks
on the constitutionality of such conditions, the courts seldom relied
solely on the implications of the McAuliffe doctrine, but almost invariably proceeded to discuss the reasonableness of the particular
challenged condition. 6
352 (1950); Tolman v. Underhill, 229 P.2d 447 (Cal. App. 1951) (invalidating
loyalty oaths because of such conflict); cf. Shub v. Simpson, 196 Md. 177, 76

A.2d 332, decision announced, 75 A.2d 842, appeal dismissed, 340 U.S. 881 (1950)
(statutory oath held to implement constitutionally prescribed oath). Cases are
discussed in Note, 18 A.L.R. 2d- 268, 357 (1950).

3. E.g., Crenshaw v. United States, 134 U.S. 99 (1890); Taylor v. Beckham,

178 U.S. 548 (1900); Field v. Giegengack, 73 F.2d 945 (D.C. Cir. 1934).
4. 155 Mass. 216, 29 N.E. 517 (1892).

4a. Ibid.
5. E.g., Goldway v. Board of Higher Education, 178 Misc. 1023, 1025, 37
N.Y.S.2d 34, 36 (Sup. Ct. 1942); CIO v. City of Dallas, 19 S.W.2d 143, 147 (Tex.
Civ. App. 1946); Rogan v. Cook, 52 A.2d 625, 629 (Md. App. 1947); Steiner

v. Darby, 88 Cal. App. 2d 481, 487, 199 P.2d 429, 432 (1948), cert. granted,

337 U.S. 929, dismissed, 338 U.S. 327 (1949); Hirschman v. Los Angeles County,
231 P.2d 140, 143 (Cal. App., 1951), affd, 39 Cal. 2d. 698, 249 P.2d 287 (1952).
6. E.g., Daniman v. Board of Educ., 306 N.Y. 532, 119 N.E.2d 373, 378 (1954);
Appeal of Albert, 372 Pa. 13, 92 A.2d 663 (1952); Bell v. District Court of
Holyoke, 314 Mass. 622, 51 N.E.2d 328 (1943)-; Perez v. Board Police Comm'rs of
Los Angeles, 78 Cal. App. 2d 638, 178 P.2d 537 (1947); Rogan v. Cook, 52 A.2d
625 (Md. App. 1947); Goldway v. Board of Higher Educ., 178 Misc. 1023, 37
N.Y.S.2d 34 (Sup. Ct. 1942); Butterworth v. Boyd, 12 Cal.2d 140, 82 P.2d 434
(1938).
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Indeed, in the McAuliffe case itself, Judge Holmes, after stating his
oft-quoted dictum, went on to say that
"... the city may impose any reasonable conditions upon holding office within its control. This condition seems to us reasonable, if that
be a question open to revision heie."6a (Emphasis supplied.)
The source of this requirement of reasonableness was not articulated.
Whether it derived from recognition of certain undefined rights in
public employment, whether it reflected some unformulated theory
whereby constitutional guarantees become relevant in considering
conditions of public employment or whether it arose from an unconceptualized and subjective feeling that legislation ought not be arbitrary irrespective of any constitutional provisions, 7 was not enunciated
in the opinions.
In 1941, the question of the constitutionality of conditions of employment was squarely presented to the Supreme Court of the United
States in United Public Workers v. Mitchell.8 That case challenged
the constitutionality of Section 9 (a) of the Hatch Act,8a which forbids
federal employees from taking "any active part in political management or in political campaigns." In upholding, the legislation, Mr.
Justice Reed states that he does not find any constitutional obstacles.
The regulation of public employees was the responsibility of Congress
and the President. "If in their judgment, efficiency may be best
obtained by prohibiting active participation by classified employees in
politics as party officers or workers, we see no constitutional objec6a. 29 N.E. 517, 518.
7. Cf. concurring opinion of Mr. Justice Frankfurter in Joint Anti-Facist
Refugee Comm'n v. McGrath, 341 U.S. 123, 162-72 (1951).

8. 330 U.S. 75 (1947). Prior to the Mitchell case, the court had passed upon

the legality of conditions of employment in only a few cases. In Ex parte
Curtis, 106 U.S. 371 (1882), an employee was indicted for violation of an
act that forbade certain employees from giving or receiving money for political
purposes from or to other employees of the government. The opinion dealt
principally with the contention that since Congress could only act pursuant
to delegated powers, and since the Constitution did not specifically authorize
such a law, the act was unconstitutional. The court rejected this contention
holding that the law was a reasonable means of improving efficiency and integrity in the public service and that such a purpose is within the congressional power under the "necessary and proper" clause of the Constitution.
Although questions of freedom of speech and assembly had been presented
in the briefs, the court did not discuss those problems. Mr. Justice Bradley
dissented vigorously on the ground that the right to accept and be candidate
for office is a fundamental right of which "the Legislature cannot deprive the
citizen, nor clog its exercise with conditions that are repugnant to his other
fundamental rights." (Id. at 376) In United States v. Thayer, 209 U.S. 39
(1908), an employee was indicted for violation of a statute prohibiting solicitation for politcal purposes but the case did not raise any constitutional question. In United States v. Wurzbach, 280 U.S. 396 (1930), a congressman was
indicted for violation of an anti-political solicitation statute. The constitutional question was dismissed in a sentence.
8a. 53 STAT. 1147 (1939), as amended, 5 U.S.C.A. § 118i(a) (Cum. Supp.

1950).
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tion." 9 By leaving the question of conditions of employment to the
judgment of Congress and the President, Mr. Justice Reed seems to
accept the McAuliffe doctrine and indeed he quotes Judge Holmes'
dictum in a footnote to the-same paragraph. Nevertheless, later in the
opinion, a qualification is introduced: the judgment of Congress and
presumably, that of the President, must be reasonably exercised: 'For
regulation of employees, it is not necessary that the act regulated be
anything more than an act reasonably deemed by Congress to interfere
with the efficiency of the public service. '10
Although the source of the requirement of reasonableness is not discussed in this opinion either, here for the first time is an indication
that the Bill of Rights is at least. a mainspring. Thus, Mr. Justice
Reed states:
"Appellants urge that federal employees are protected by the Bill of
Rights and that Congress may not 'enact a regulation providing that no
Republican, Jew or Negro shall be appointed to federal office, or that
no federal employee shall attend Mass or take any active part in missionary work.' None would' deny such limitations on congressional
power but, because-there are some limitations, it does not follow that
a prohibition against acting as ward leader or worker at the polls is
invalid."loa

Just which portion of the Bill of Rights limits Congress is not
revealed. The examples are not limited to any one Amendment; the
First Amendment certainly is apposite to some;" the Fifth Amendment
probably to all.12 The very intermingling of these examples is no small
indication that neither the basis for the protection offered nor its
13
extent has yet been crystallized.
9. 330 U.S. 75, 99 (1947) (emphasis supplied).
10. Id. at 101. The opinion then discusses at length the reasonableness of the
Hatch Act. For full discussion of the Hatch Act and the Mitchell decision see
Kircheimer, The Historical and Comparative Background of the Hatch Law,
II Public Policy 341 (1941); Mosher, Government Employees Under the Hatch
Act, 22 N.Y.U.L.Q. REv. 233 (1947); Esman, The Hatch Act -A Reappraisal,60
YALE L.J. 986 (1951).

10a. 330 U.S. 75, 100 (1947).
11. Earlier, however, Mr. Justice Reed had rejected the contention that

Section 9(b) of the Hatch Act contravened the First Amendment with little
more than a curt statement that "these fundamental human rights are not
absolute." Id. at 95. It is not clear whether Mr. Justice Reed meant by this

that the First Amendment was not being violated because of the reasonableness of Section 9(b) or whether he thought that conditions of public em-

ployment were outside the scope of First Amendment protection.
12. The Due Process Clause has long been held to incorporate freedoms
protected by the First Amendment: Gitlow v. New York, 268 U.S. 652 (1925);
Morrison, Does the Fourteenth Amendment Incorporate the Bill of Rights? The Judicial Interpretation,2 STAN. L. REv. 140 (1940); Green, The Supreme
Court, The Bill of Rights and the States, 97 U. OF PA. L. REV. 608 (1949).
13. No such ambiguity exists in the dissenting opinion by Mr. Justice Black
in which Mr. Justice Douglas joined. Public employees, the dissent states, are
entitled to the same constitutional guarantees as private employees and the
prohibition in the Hatch Act is a clear violation of the First Amendment.

VANDERBILT LAW REVIEW

[ VOL. 8

The next full discussion of conditions of employment occurs in
Garner v. Board of Public Works of Los Angeles,14 one of the first of
the loyalty oath cases. 15 The City Charter of Los Angeles barred from
employment persons who advocated or affiliated themselves with
groups who advocate the overthrow of the government. A city ordinance required every employee to take an oath that within a period
subsequent to the enactment of the charter provision, he had not been
a member of or affiliated with such a group. The ordinance also required the execution of an affidavit stating, inter alia, whether or not
the employee was or ever had been a member of the Communist Party
or the Communist Political Association. Some of the plaintiffs took the
oath, but refused to execute the affidavit; the others refused to do
both. All were discharged and brought suit seeking reinstatement.
Although it was vigorously argued that the oath violated constitutional guarantees of free speech, Mr. Justice Clark does not discuss this
16
contention or even mention it specifically.
But the petitioner had also argued that the oath violated Due Process,
because the oath was not limited to affiliation with organizations
known to the employee to be in the prescribed class. Mr. Justice Clark
rejects this argument on the ground that there was no reason to suppose that the oath will be construed as affecting adversely those persons who during their affiliation with a prescribed organization were
innocent of its purpose. Rather, he assumed scienter was implicit
in each clause of the oath.
This discussion is significant. Here for the first time, the majority
opinion recognizes "due process" as a limitation on condition of employment. True, the limitation is negatively derived from its rejection in the instant case; it is advanced indecisively-figuratively and
literally in small letters; its extent is not elaborated. Nevertheless,
the seed is there.
Equally significant is the opinion of Mr. Justice Frankfurter con14. 341 U.S. 716 (1951).

15. The first of the recent loyalty cases was actually Gerende v. Board of
Supervisors of Board of Elections of Baltimore City, 341 U.S. 56 (1951). This
was an appeal from a decision of the Maryland Court of Appeals, the effect
of which was to deny the appellant a place on the ballot for a municipal election on the ground that she refused to file a loyalty affidavit required by Maryland law. The court, after satisfying itself that the Maryland statute would be
interpreted so that the affiant need only state that he was not knowingly a
member of an organization engaged in an attempt to overthrow the government by force or violence, then affirmed the state court without further discussion. There was no discussion whatever of constitutional provisions.
Whether the necessity for scienter emphasized by the court stemmed from
constitutional safeguards or elsewhere is not revealed.

16. Mr. Justice Clark does say, not as to the Ordinance, but as to the
Charter, that to the extent that the oath operates prospectively: "We assume
that under the Federal Constitution, the Charter amendment is valid ... [as] a
reasonable regulation to protect the municipal service by establishing an
employment qualification of loyalty to the State and the United States." 341
U.S. 716, 720-21 (1951).
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curring in part and dissenting in part. Here for the first time there
is an open rejection of the privilege-right thinking that formed the
basis of the McAuliffe doctrine. Mr. Justice Frankfurter begins by
accepting the concept that the Constitution does not guarantee public
employment. But it does not follow, he says, that a government may
17
resort to any scheme for keeping people out of such employment.
To describe public employment as a privilege, Mr. Justice Frankfurter
states, does not "meet the problem." Mr. Justice Frankfurter then
seeks to meet the problem by applying the Due Process Clause. This
Clause, he finds, does not preclude Los Angeles from requiring its
employees to disclose whether they have been members of the Communist Party or the Communist Political Association. On the other
hand, the Due Process Clause does not allow the City to ask its employees "on pain of giving up public employment, to swear to something they cannot be expected to know."'18 Hence, an oath which is
not limited to affiliation with organizations known at the time to have
advocated overthrow of government, may not be required. Mr.
Justice Frankfurter makes no attempt to amplify the considerations
leading to this approach. For the time being, he is content merely to
thus firmly introduce the Due Process Clause.
The Garnercase was followed by Adler v. Board of Education of the
City of New York. 19 Involved here was a New York statute, 19a the
Feinberg Law, which disqualified for employment in the public school
system any person who teaches or advocates or was knowingly a member of an organization which teaches or advocates the overthrow of
the government by force or violence.
It was argued that the Feinberg Law and the rules promulgated
under it constitute an abridgment of the freedom of speech and assembly of persons employed or seeking employment in the public
schools of New York. Mr. Justice Minton does not begin his discussion
of this contention by weighing the guarantees of the First Amendment
against the purposes sought to be secured by the Feinberg Law. Nor
does he approach the problem as one involving the First Amendment
at all, Quite the contrary; the First Amendment, in his view, is not
a relevant consideration, and the reasons given were the familiar
ones advanced in the McAuliffe case:
"It is clear that such persons have the right under our law to assemble, speak, think and believe as they will.... It is equally clear
that they have no right to work for the State in the school system on
their own terms. United Public Workers v. Mitchell, 330 U.S. 75. They
may work for the school system upon the reasonable terms laid down
17. Id. at 725.
18. Id. at 728.

19. 342 U.S. 485 (1952).
19a. N.Y. Laws 1949, c. 360.
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by the proper authorities of New York. If they do not choose to work
on such terms, they are at liberty to retain their beliefs and associations and go elsewhere. Has the State thus deprived them of any
right to free speech or assembly? We think not." 20

Here in one breath seems to be a reversion back to the privilege

concept. Nevertheless, in the next breath, Mr. Justice Minton goes
on to discuss the reasonableness of the Feinberg Law and to state
that the law does not deny due process-without stating why, in the
wake of his first premise, reasonableness is at all relevant. Manifestly,
old concepts do not die quickly; they fade away gradually with occasional resurgences.
Nine months later came the decision in Wieman v. Updegraff2 ' in
which the court for the first time invalidated a state loyalty oath enactment. The State of Oklahoma had adopted a statute prescribing a
loyalty oath for all state officers and employees regarding their
membership in any "communist front or subversive organization."
As interpreted by the Supreme Court of Oklahoma, association alone
in the prescribed organization constituted disloyalty and disqualification; it did not matter whether the association by the employee existed

innocently or knowingly. Mr. Justice Clark, writing for the Court,
reversed the state court which had sustained the oath. The basis of
the reversal is contained in the following sentences: "Indiscriminate
classification of innocent with knowing activity must fall as an assertion of arbitrary power. The oath offends due process."
The plaintiff,2 2 however, relying on the McAuliffe-type language in
the Adler decision, argued that public employment was a privilege
and could be bestowed upon such conditions as the state chose. Mr.
Justice Clark refers to this argument and rejects it:
"We are referred to our statement in Adler that persons seeking employment in the New York public schools have 'no right to work for
the State in the school system on their own terms.' . . . To draw from
this language the facile generalization that there is no constitutionally
protected right to public employment is to obscure the issue. For, in
United Public Workers, though we held that the Federal Government
through the Hatch Act could properly bar its employees from certain
types of political activity thought inimical to the interests of the Civil
Service, we cast this holding into perspective by emphasizing that
Congress could not 'enact a regulation providing that no Republican,
Jew or Negro shall be appointed to federal office, or that no federal
employee shall attend Mass or take any active part in missionary
work.' 330 U.S. at 100 ....
We need not pause to consider whether an
20. 342 U.S. 485, 492 (1952).
21. 344 U.S. 183 (1952).
22. Plaintiff, Updegraff, brought the suit as a citizen and taxpayer to enjoin the necessary state officials from paying further compensation to employees who had not subscribed to the oath.
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abstract right to public employment exists. It is sufficient to say that

constitutional protection does extend to the public servant whose exclusion pursuant to a statute is patently arbitrary or discrimina-

tory."23
Essentially, the Court here follows the line of analysis advanced by
Mr. Justice Frankfurter in the Garnercase. The Court refuses to consider the problem in terms of the privilege-right dichotomy. In Garner,
Mr. Justice Frankfurter stated that to describe government employment as a privilege does not meet the issue. In the Updegraff case, Mr.
Justice Clark takes the same view with regard to the "right" side of the
dichotomy.
Rejection of these concepts seems justified. The difficulty with the
privilege-right concept is that it tends to present the problem in
terms of absolutes, that is, whether or not government employees are
entitled to any protection against conditions of employment. Thus,
courts which reject an attack on the conditions of employment by
reasoning that government employment was a "privilege," assign to
that term a definition which permitted placing any conditions upon
its grant or denial. On the other hand, characterization of government
employment as a "right" suggests extreme limit on the governmental
power over its employment. 24 So defined, this classification indeed
does not meet the issue. For the question is not whether on the one
hand the government is free to deal with public employees as it
chooses or whether on the other the government can impose no restrictions on public employees. No one seriously contends that the
government can not impose some conditions of employment. Likewise, few courts would deny that public employees have a substantial enough interest so that the government may not be wholly
unfettered in dealing with them. Indeed the latter value judgment,
it would seem, had been made in all those cases where the courts felt
constrained to justify the reasonableness of a particular condition of
employment under attack.25 Once these judgments are made, however, the question still remains to what extent the government is to
be limited in dealing with public employment. In short, the difficult
issue is not one of whether, but one of how much. Here the privilegeright terminology offers little help. Even if one were able to put
aside the emotive connotations of these terms and were willing to assay precise definition, the problem would still be one of finding
material from some other source out of which to fashion the definition.
23. Id. at 191-92.
24. Compare the opinion in United States v. Curtis, 12 Fed. 824 (C.C.S.D.N.Y.
1882) and the dissenting opinion of Mr. Justice Bradley in Ex parte Curtis
(same case) 106 U.S. 371, 376 (1882). Compare the majority and dissenting
opinions in Bailey v. Richardson, 182 F.2d 46 (D.C. Cir. 1950), aff'd without
opinon by an equally divided Supreme Court, Mr. Justice Clark not participating, 341 U.S. 918 (1951).
25. See discussion, supra, pp. 817-19.
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The Court has rather chosen to approach the problem in Due Process
terms.2 Concededly, to declare that Due Process is applicable is also
to state a conclusion since initially, at least, it constitutes another way
of saying that the government employment is a "privilege" or a "right"
of a limited nature.2a But the value of the Due Process formulation
is that it does not stop there; it accomplishes what the privilege-right
dichotomy does not do. For Due Process, once applicable, traditionally
raises the question of how much, 27 and it is this issue which is the
key one to be decided in this area. Moreover, the issue once framed
in Due Process terminology, is placed in a frame of reference that can
draw for its solution an existing line of analysis and analogies.
Once government employment has been supplied a
Due Process
frame of reference, it would seem that the considerations will not be
merely the same as those employed in the decisions which were
willing to accept a standard of reasonableness, 28 but without any
constitutional base for the standard. For Due Process includes also
protection of fundamental liberties such as speech and assembly; 2
hehce, in a Due Process framework, conditions of employment are
likely to be considered not only in terms of whether they are reasonably designed to promote public efficiency; they would also be weighed
against the loss to those freedoms traditionally protected by the Due
Process Clause.
Conceivably, a broad conception of reasonableness might include
26. In a number of analogous situations, the court has employed the doctrine
of unconstitutional conditions. This doctrine holds that although a state has

the power to deny or grant a privilege altogether, it cannot impose as a

condition for granting of the privilege the relinquishment of constitutional
rights: e.g., Terral v. Burke Constr. Co., 257 U.S. 529 (1922)

(condition that

a foreign corporation give up its constitutional right to use the federal courts
held void); Frost v. Railroad Comm'n, 271 U.S. 588 (1926) (foreign private
carrier unconstitutionally deprived of property by state requirement that it
become a public carrier in order to secure a permit); cf. Hannegan v. Esquire,
Inc., 327 U.S. 146, 155-56 (1946); Shawnessy v. United States ex. rel. Meyer,
345 U.S. 201 (1953). Although employing the language of privilege, the doctrine of unconstitutional conditions, in effect, has redefined that term to include constitutional guarantees. That doctrine does not, however, help determine which constitutional guarantees are applicable and to what extent.
26a. The Court never pinpoints the reason for concluding that Due Process
is applicable. It may be that the Due Process Clause acts as a limitation on
legislation even when it does not deal with subjects which are necessarily
categorized as life, liberty or property. Such a limitation, of course, might be
difficult to formulate in a jurisprudence which derives its absolutes from a
constitution rather than from natural laws. Be that as it may, for the present

the Court is content to invoke Due Process, leaving for future decisions
analysis of its source.
27. Joint Anti-Fascist Refugee Comin'n v. McGrath, 341 U.S. 123, 150, 16165 (1951), concurring opinion by Frankfurter, J.
28. E.g., in United Public Workers v. Mitchell, 330 U.S. 75, 101 (1946), Mr.
Justice Reed stated: "For regulation of employees it is not necessary that the

act regulated be anything more than an act reasonably deemed by Congress
to interfere with the efficiency of the public service."

29. Gitlow v. New York, 268 U.S. 652 (1925); Palko v. Connecticut, 302 U.S.

319 (1925); Schneider v. Irvington, 308 U.S. 147 (1939); cf. Adamson v. California, 332 U.S. 46 (1947); Rochin v. California, 342 U.S. 165 (1952).
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the balancing of the same factors. Psychologically and practically,
however, consideration of the reasonableness of conditions of employment was never so oriented. Even where the consideration 'included such factors as "practice, history and changing educational,
social and economic conditions," 30 it was in terms of whether the
conditions of employment were designed to improve the public service.
In short, on the one side of the scale was the objective of government
efficiency; on the other was the reasonableness of the method chosen
to achieve the efficiency. Due Process adds another set of values to
the scale: one of basic liberties. It is here that Wieman v. Updegraff is
likely to serve its most useful purpose. Even without giving such
values any favored status,3 ' it is probable that the conditions that the
government may impose on its employees would be tested more rigorously where such a balance is required than where the conditions are
evaluated as a matter of reasonableness alone but outside of the Due
Process framework of values.
Acceptance of the Due Process limitations does not mean, however,
that the significance of the government interest in protecting the public
service will not be recognized and that employment situations will be
treated in precisely the same manner as non-employment situations.
Due Process is one which is appropriate to the case. Legislation appropriate for public employees may not be suitable for private
citizens. Indeed as to public employees themselves, what may satisfy
Due Process where the sanction is dismissal may not suffice where
criminal sanctions are involved. 32 And what may be acceptable for an
30. United Public Workers v. Mitchell, 330 U.S. 75, 102 (1946).

31. A now famous footnote 4 in United States v. Carolene Prod. Co., 304 U.S.
144, 152 (1938) suggested that there "may be a narrower scope for operation
of the presumption of constitutionality when legislation appears on its face
to be within a specific prohibition of the Constitution, such as those of the
first ten amendments, which are deemed equally specific when held to be
embraced within the Fourteenth." The footnote was cited in several decisions
which indicate that the rights guaranteed by the First Amendment occupy
a "preferred position." Schneider v. Irvington, 308 U.S. 147 (1939); Thomas
v. Collins, 323 U.S. 516 (1945). Mr. Justice Frankfurter takes strong exception
to any such principle of constitutional law in his concurring opinion in Kovacs
v. Cooper, 336 U.S. 77, 90-97 (1948).
32. Where conditions of employment affect freedom of speech, and their
breach involves criminal sanctions, it might be argued that the clear and
present danger test should be utilized. As stated by Judge Learned Hand,
"the question presented- under this test is whether the gravity of the evil, discounted by its improbability, justifies such invasion of free speech as is necessary to avoid the danger." [This statement of the rule was adopted in Dennis
v. United States, 341 U.S. 494 (1951)]. In the case of public employees, the
evil would appear to be impairment of the efficiency and integrity of the public
service. Following Judge Hand's statement, the first consideration would be
the probability that this evil will occur in the absence of the desired condition of employment; the second consideration would be whether the gravity
of the danger to the public service to the extent that it is likely to occur,
justifies the invasion of speech that is necessary to avoid the danger. ,The
vitality of the clear and present danger test after Dennis v. United States,
supra, is doubtful and certainly is not likely to be extended to the field -of
government employment. See Bailey v. Richardson, 182 F.2d 46, 61 (D.C. Cir.
1950); Comment, 46 MIcH. L. Ra-. 942, 950 (1948).
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employee in a sensitive position may not be so for one in a routine
employment.33 As Mr. Justice Frankfurter has pointed out, within
the Due Process framework the Court "has responded to the infinite
variety and perplexity of the tasks of government by recognizing that
34
what is unfair in one situation may be fair in another."
Nevertheless, analysis that considers the extent to which freedom
of speech and assembly are limited, the reasons for doing so, the available alternatives and the balance between hurt complained of and
good accomplished, 35 can neither be cavalier nor cursory. If Wieman
v. Updegraff compels such analysis, it is a long step forward.36
Wieman v. Updegraff, of course, is only the beginning. The limits of
governmental power in this area are still to be shaped in future decisions.3 7 Necessarily, it will be done slowly. A new constitutional
doctrine is fashioned with caution particularly in unreceptive times.
Its full development is an evolutionary process, educating as it evolves
so that with its maturity comes also receptiveness. But Wieman v.
Updegraff has planted the seed firmly. The cases that follow will undoubtedly see it nourished until it becomes firmly rooted as part of
our constitutional thinking about public employment.
II. LABOR RELATIONS AND PUBLIc EMPLOYMENT

Along with the increased number of public employees, 38 there quite
naturally has come an expansion of union activity in government
33. See Byse, A Report on the Pennsylvania Loyalty Act, 101 U. OF PA. L.
REV. 480, 491, 506-08 (1953); Phelps, Brown and Goudsmit, Toward a Positive
Security Program, 11 BULL. OF THE ATOMIC SCIENTISTS 165 (April 1955).
34. Joint Anti-Fascist Refugee Comm'n v. McGrath, 341 U.S. 123, 163
(1951).
35. Ibid.
36. If this analysis is undertaken, it may well be that counsel challenging
a condition of employment should seek to depart from the usual practice
whereby invalidity is raised on the pleadings alone. Proof of the effectiveness
of a condition of employment, the alternative available, the undue scope of
condition and similar item [see, e.g., Horowitz, Report on the Los Angeles City
and County Loyalty Programs,5 STAN. L. REV. 233 (1953)] may help the plaintiff
overcome the presumption against him. Whether this can be done is a problem
not peculiar to this area alone, but present whenever the constitutionality of
a statute is challenged.

See FREUND, ON UNDERSTANDING THE SUPREME COURT

86-92 (1951).
37. Wieman v. Updegraff has already made itself felt in state decisions,
See, e.g., Haynes v. Brennan, 135 N.Y.S.2d 900 (1954); Hamilton v. Brennan,
203 Misc. 536, 119 N.Y.S.2d 83 (1953) (arbitrary disqualification of policemen
from eligibility list because of alleged subversive activity held unconstitutional). The principles of the Updegraff case were also strongly argued in
Peters v. Hobby, where the question was whether procedural due process had
been denied. See e.g., Reply Brief for Petitioner, p. 14; 23 U.S.L. WEEK 3265,
3267 (April 26, 1955). That case was decided on nonconstitutional grounds.
Peters v. Hobby, 23 U.S.L. WEEK 4311 (June 7, 1955).
38. In 1950, there were 7,015,000 public employees; 2,400,836 were federal
,employees; 1,103,441 state employees; and 3,418,262 employees of local government units. See U. S. BUR. OF THE CENSUS, STATISTICAL ABSTRACT OF THE UNITED
STATES: 1953 Table No. 423, p. 393 (74th ed. 1953).
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employment. 39 The problems in this area generally fall into three
categories: (1) union membership; (2) strikes by public employees;
(3) collective bargaining.
(1) Union Membership.40 Prior to Wieman v. Updegraff,41 it was
generally assumed that the government employer could if it wished
prohibit union membership as a condition of employment. Insofar as
the Updegraff case held that conditions of employment must not offend against Due Process, the question arises whether a prohibition
against union activity is so related to the public efficiency that it outweighs the substantial interest of public employees in organizing and
joining labor organizations.
A sweeping ordinance prohibiting all city employees from joining
labor unions 42 was upheld in C.I.O. v. City of Dallas.43 The court
relying on the McAuliffe doctrine, rejected arguments of unconstitutionality. The opinion also took the view that union activity by government employees is "incompatible with the spirit of democracy," and
"inconsistent with every principle upon which our Government is
founded," and that nothing "is more dangerous to public welfare than
to admit that hired servants of the state can dictate to the Government
the hours, the wages and conditions under which they will carry .on
essential services vital to the welfare, safety and security of the
citizens.""4 Apart from the fact that the Dallas ordinance was not
limited to employees performing essential services, it is apparent that
the court's view of the effects of union activity was not characterized
by objectivity or accuracy. Evaluated in a due process framework of
values, 45 an absolute prohibition of the Dallas type would seem difficult to sustain.
More frequently, restrictions on union membership have been im39. As of January 1, 1949, 706 of 1072 American cities

(population over

10,000) had some or all of their employees organized into unions. See MUNIcIPAL YEARBOOK OF THE INTERNATIONAL CITY MANAGERS AssocuATioN

140-43

(1949).

40. For an excellent discussion of this problem, see Note, Union Activity
in Public Employment, 55 COL. L. REV. 344 (1955); Comment, 45 ILL. L. REV.
364 (1950).
41. 344 U.S. 183 (1952). See discussion supra pp. 822-23.
42. Absolute restrictions are infrequent. Exceptions are an Alabama statute

which prohibits most state employees from participating in labor organizations

(Ala. Acts 1953, Act 720) and a Georgia statute making membership in a
labor union by city, county or state policemen a misdemeanor [GA. CODE ANN:

§§ 54-909 and 54-9923 (Supp. 1954)]; cf. N.J. Const. Art. 1, § 19 guaranteeing
persons in public employment the right to organize and to present their

grievances.
43. 198 S.W.2d 143 (Tex. Civ. App. 1946) rehearing denied November 29, 1946.
44. Id. at 145. The court (Looney, J.) quoted with approval from Railway

Mail Ass'n v. Murphy, 180 Misc. 868, 44 N.Y.S.2d 601 (Sup. Ct. 1943), ap-

parently unaware that that decision had been reversed by the Appellate
Division, and that the Court of Appeals and the Supreme Court of the
United States had affirmed Railway Mail Ass'n v. Corsi, 326 U.S. 88 (1945).
45. See discussion supra,at pp. 824-26.
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posed upon firemen and policemen. 46 In such cases, one justification
offered is that union activity tends to create strikes which in the vital
areas of police and fire protection would be detrimental to the public
safety.47 But this reasoning does not seem valid where the state or
48 or where
municipality is already protected by anti-strike legislation
49
the union charter itself contains no-strike provisions.
Nor does the quasi-military discipline of police and fire departments provide adequate justification for prohibition against union
activity,50 especially if union activity takes place during off-duty
hours. At any event, the many cities which allow union activity by
police and firemen have not reported any apparent impairment of
service efficiency. 5' Indeed, the existence of an employees' organization
through which grievances, real or imagined, can be channeled and
aired, may well be a boon to morale. For in semi-military organizations, the individual with a complaint must go through the chain of
command and his grievance is not likely to reach the higher levels of
officialdom. An employees' organization assures the employee that
his complaint will be presented at a responsible level; by the same
token it relieves intermediate officers from the necessity of resolving
numerous individual complaints on an ad hoc and possibly inconsistent
basis.52
46. Cases are collected in RHYNE, LABOR UNIONS AND MUNICIPAL EMPLOYEE
LAw (1946); Comment, 45 ILL. L. REV. 364, 365 (1950).
47. See Perez v. Board of Police Comm'rs, 78 Cal. App. 2d, 638, 641, 646,
178 P.2d 537, 539, 541-43 (1947); CIO v. Dallas, 198 S.W.2d 143, 148-49 (Tex.
Civ. App. 1946); Hutchinson v. Magee, 278 Pa. 119, 122 Atl. 234 (1923).
48. See note 64 infra.
49. E.g., the Constitution of the City Fire Fighter's Association. Local No. 22,
of Philadelphia, Pa., International Association of Fire Fighters, (affiliated with
AFL) provides in Art. II: "We will not strike or take action in any sympathetic strike. Our position is peculiar to most organized workers, as we are
sworn to protect the homes and properties of communities in case of fire or
other serious hazards." See also Hickman v. Mobile, 256 Ala. 141, 144, 145,
53 So.2d 752, 754, 755 (1951); Agger, The Government and Its Employees, 47
YALE L.J. 1109 (1938). The point may be made, however, that unofficial or
wildcat strikes are more likely to occur where union activity is permitted.
50. Cases upholding restrictions frequently assign this reason. E.g., King v.
Priest, 357 Mo. 68, 84, 206 S.W.2d 547, 554 (1947), appeal dismissed, 333 U.S.
852 (1948) where the court, in sustaining a rule of the St. Louis Police Department prohibiting its members from joining a union, said: "The legislature recognized the necessity for order, discipline and authority in the
police force.... We think the rule in question bears a direct relationship to
both the discipline and the government of the police force."
151. E.g., in Philadelphia, the Fraternal Order of Police, while technically
not classified as a union, functions as a labor organization representing policemen. According to Philadelphia Police Commissioner Thomas J. Gibbons,
this organization, although extremely active, has not impaired the efficiency
of the force in any way.
52. In New York, the Mayor's "Interim Order on the Conduct of Relations
Between the City of New York and Its Employees" stated: "It has been generally demonstrated that when employees through their chosen representatives are accorded a reasonable and orderly opportunity to present their
proposals to their employers regarding the terms and conditions of their
employment and are assured adequate machinery for the redress of their
grievances, it can result in a better and more efficient functional operation
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In some cases, a restriction on union membership has been defended
as reasonable on the theory that it prevents divided loyalties. 53 Thus,
in one case,54 a ban on union membership of employees of the Department of Buildings and Safety was upheld on the rationale that such
employees could not impartially administer the municipal building
code if they were officers of a national union whose members were
required to seek permits from the city. Similarly, it has been suggested that police or other government employees engaged in labor
disputes should not become affiliated with national unions because
of the danger of sympathetic strikes and the possible partiality of such
employees in disputes involving their unions or affiliated organizations.55 The danger seems more imagined than real. Thbat union
loyalties will project themselves on a national level or run so deep as to
impair loyalty and efficiency is a doubtful premise. 56 The same reasoning would require, for example, that policemen could not be trusted
to arrest fellow city employees who have committed crimes or that
building inspectors cannot be relied upon to inspect buildings occupied by members of the same fraternal association, church or other
group. In any event, even if government employees engaged in labor
disputes should not affiliate with national unions, it does not mean
that they should be prohibited from union activity where it is of a
local variety. Absolute restrictions against union membership, even
among police and firemen, it would seem, may well border on the
arbitrary. Certainly as a corollary of Updegraff, the re-examination of
such restrictions is appropriate.
(2) Strikes by Public Employees. 57 Where services essential to
and entity."

(Quoted by Burke, Report of Committee on Municipal Officers

and Employee Problems, 18 NAT. MUNIC. L. REV. 303, 314 (1955).

53. King v. Priest, 357 Mo. 68, 206 S.W.2d 547 (1947),

appeal dismissed

333 U.S. 852 (1948); Young v. Board of Bldg. & Safety Comm'rs, 100 Cal.

App. 2d 468, 224 P.2d 16 (1950).
54. Young v. Board of Bldg. & Safety Comm'rs, supra note 53.
55. See Kaplan, Policemen in Labor Unions, 7 'CIVIL SERV. L. REP. 61, 64-66
(1951); GODINE, THE LABOR PROBLEM IN PUBLIC SERVICE 66-70 (1951). However in NLRB v. Jones & Laughlin Steel Corp., 331 U.S. 416 (1947), the Court
decided that guards employed in a private plant had the right to be represented by the same union as the other employees, although the guards' duties

included protection of plant property from damages by other employees.

The National Labor Relations Act now provides otherwise. 29 U.S.C.A. §
159(b) (3) (1947).
56. See footnote 49, infra. Even where police and fire associations affiliate
themselves with a national union, the affiliation is frequently only a nominal
one. The close contacts and interrelationships sometimes found between the
various unions of an industry organized along craft lines, do not exist
between police and fire unions and the national unions with which they may
be associated. Some associations, such as the Fraternal Order of Police, not
only have no affiliation with a national union, but also claim that they are

not a "union," although they apparently function as one.

57. An excellent discussion is found in Note, Strikes by Government Employees, 2 VAN. L. REV. 441 (1949).; See generally, ZISKiND, ONE THOUSAND
STRIKES OF GOVERNMENT EMPLOYEES (1940).
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community health or safety are involved, few would disagree that
strikes by public employees should be prohibited. But the courts have
not drawn the line at that point and have denied public employees
a right to strike under any circumstances.5 8 Where no anti-strike legislation exists and where the employees are not engaged in essential
services, there is little reason to hold that a strike by public employees
is so contrary to the public welfare that it must be enjoined. It may
be that the interest of the public and of the employees in freedom of
tcollective action is more substantial than the interest of the public in
maintaining non-essential government operations.5 9 In today's highly
industrialized and unionized society, the question is at least a debatable
one. This being so, it would seem more appropriate for the legislature
than for the judiciary to determine whether strike activity by employees engaged in non-essential services is illegal. Under this view,
in the absence of any legislative ban, a court of equity would refrain
from enjoining a peaceful strike by such public employees.60
Some courts have indicated that where the government acts in a
"proprietary" as opposed to a "governmental" capacity, the government employee should be treated no differently labor-relations-wise
than the employee in private enterprise. 61 Whatever the value of the
governmental proprietary distinction in tort areas, it fails to afford the
basis for a valid dichotomy in labor relations. The determination of
whether a given function is governmental or proprietary is influenced
by such factors as whether the function is one traditionally engaged in
58. City of Cleveland v. Division 268 of Amalgamated Ass'n, 85 Ohio App.

153, 85 N.E.2d 811 (1949); same parties, 90 N.E.2d 711 (Ohio 1949); Good-

fellow v. Civil Serv. Comm'n, 312 Mich. 226, 20 N.W.2d 170 (1945) (discharge
for strike activity); Los Angeles v. Los Angeles Bldg. & Constr. Trades Council,
94 Cal. App. 2d 36, 210 P.2d 305 (1945) (strike to demand collective bargaining
is for unlawful purposes); Norwalk Teachers' Ass'n v. Board of Educ., 138
Conn. 269, 83 A.2d 482 (1951) (declaratory judgment that public employees

have no right to strike). Cases are collected in RHYNE, LABOR UNIONS AND
MUNICIPAL EMPLOYEE LAW 44-50 (1946). Temporary injunctions are gen-

erally granted in-these cases, since anti-injunction laws are held inapplicable
to public employees. United States v. United Mine Workers, 330 U.S. 258
(1947); Note, 55 COL. L. Rsv. 344, 359-60 (1955).
59. A determination by the legislature that strikes by public employees
should be unlawful is not likely to offend Due Process. City of Detroit v.
Division 26 of Amalgamated Ass'n, 332 Mich. 237, 51 N.W.2d 228 (1952). But.
cf. Stapleton v. Mitchell, 60 F. Supp. 51 (D. Kan. 1945), appeal dismissed, 326
U.S. 690 (1945); Note, 2 VAND. L. REV. 441, 442 (1949). However, different considerations may be involved if a ban on peaceful picketing is attempted.
Thornhill v. Alabama, 310 U.S. 88 (1940); Vogt, Inc. v. Teamsters' Union, 24
U.S.L. WEEK 2019 (Wis. July 12, 1955).
60. By the same token, to strike would, not be just cause for discharge.
But cf. Goodfellow v. Civil Serv. Comm'n, 312 Mich. 226, 20 N.W.2d 170 (1945).
61. Local 266, I.B.E.W. v. Salt River Project Agricultural Improvement &
Power Dist., 78 Ariz. 30, 275 P.2d 393 (1954) (employee of an agricultural improvement and power district may strike peacefully to enforce execution of
a collective bargaining agreement); see RHYNE, LABOR UNIONS AND MUNICIPAL
EMPLOYEE LAW 53-56 (1946); contra,Cleveland v. Division 268 of the Amalgamated Ass'n of Street Elec. Ry. & Motor Coach Employees, 90 N.E.2d 711
(Ohio 1949).

1955]

19 PUBLIC EMPLOYMENT -

by the government, whether it is undertaken for pecuniary profit, and
by the precedent peculiar to a given jurisdiction.62 Such criteria can
have little bearing on a decision as to whether strikes should be permitted. It makes little sense, for example, to prohibit a strike among
employees in the city's personnel office because it is operated in a
governmental capacity, while permitting strikes among employees
in the city's water plant, because it is operated in a proprietary
63
capacity.
64
In a number of states anti-strike legislation has been enacted. In
many of these statutes the prohibition applies to all employees, no distinction being drawn either on the basis of governmental and pro65
prietary service or on the basis of essential and non-essential services.
Frequently enacted in the wake of strikes which have aroused public
indignation, such legislation does not represent a mature approach
to public employee labor relations. Granting that the government
has the power to treat public employees differently than private employees, (and even if successful in preventing strike activity,66) a unilateral approach to labor relations is neither fair nor likely to achieve
a high level of efficiency and cooperation. The reason for prohibiting
strikes must stem from a sounder rationale than the power to do so.
Hence arguments frequently advanced on behalf of strike prohibitions 67 are that (1) strikes against the sovereignty of the government are inherently unlawful; (2) strikes cause such a loss to government prestige as to weaken its authority; (3) they are unnecessary
because the government does not function for profit; (4) they compel
the government administrator to exercise his discretion in a certain
way. The first of these arguments, apart from its absolutist overtones,
begs the question. The second argument seems to be of doubtful ac63. See Seasongood, Objections to the Governmental or Proprietary Test,
22 VA. L. REV. 910 (1936); Barnett, The Foundations of the Distinctions Be-

tween Public and Private Functions in Respect to the Common Law Tort
Liability of Municipal Corporations,16 ORE.-L. REV. 250 (1937).
63. McQUILLIN, MUNICIPAL CORPORATIONS §§ 53.30, 53.103 (3d ed. 1949).
64. The various enactments are discussed in RHYNE, LABOR UNIONS AND
MUNICIPAL EMPLOYEE LAW - A SUPPLEMENTARY REPORT 35-50 (1949); 2 VAND.

L. REV. 441, 443, 449 (1949).
65. E.g., MICH. STAT. ANN. §§ 17.455(1)-17.455(8) (1947) [constitutionality
sustained in City of Detroit v. Division 26 of Amalgamated Ass'n, 332 Mich.
237, 51 N.W.2d 228 (1952)], discussed in Anti-Strike Legislation in Operation,
1 CIVIL SERV. L. REP. 36 (1951); Neb. Laws 1947 c. 178; N. Y. Civil Service Laws
§ 22(2) (Supp. 1954); OHIO REV. CODE ANN. §§ 4117.01-4117.05 (Baldwin 1953);
PA. STAT. ANN. tit. 43, § 215.1-215.5 (Purdon Supp. 1954). These statutes generally provide for discharge of the striking employee and prohibitions as to his
reemployment for a designated period.
66. If dissatisfaction is strong enough, anti-strike statutes are not likely to

prevent unofficial or wildcat strikes. See GODINE. THE LABOR PROBLEM IN THE
PUBLIC SERVICE 169 (1951); Schwartz, IndustrialNationalizationand Industrial

Relations in Great Britain, 97 U. oF PA. L. REV. 543, 551-53 (1949).
67. For an excellent analysis of the arguments, pro and con anti-strike legislation, see Note, 2 VAND. L. REV. 441, 445-48 (1949).
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curacy 68 and a weak foundation upon which to deny government employees freedom of collective action. The third reason erroneously
assumes that there is no conflict of interest between government employer and employee; 69 the gains through collective action put that
view quickly to rest. 70 To answer the fourth argument is to demur.
Attempts to persuade the government official to exercise his discretion are typical of our governmental system. That is precisely the
reason for many political and civic campaigns, for lobbying, collective bargaining, and for the advocacy of an attorney. Moreover,
there are checks on labor's coercive powers since there is always the
71
danger that a strike will arouse public animosity.
Thus, the only substantial reason for prohibiting strikes would
seem to be to protect the public from the adverse effects of a strike.
With that the objective, the legislature should weigh the interests in
freedom of collective action against the injury to the public health
and safety 72 resulting from a strike and decide which services are so
essential to the public interest that employees in those services should
be prohibited from striking. Obviously, this determination is often
a difficult one, requiring as it does an evaluation of the extent to
3
which the public health and safety may be affected by a strike.7
Some states have attempted this kind of determination by prohibiting strikes by employees of public utilities since, as a rule, there
is a close relation between utilities services and general health and
safety. These statutes are also applicable to utilities which are
privately owned and operated. 74 Since the consequences of labor disturbances are as serious for privately owned utilities as for those which
are publicly owned in terms of potential injury to the public health
and safety, the inclusion of such private employees appears justified.
68. ZIsKIwD, op. cit. supra note 57, at 191, 249.
69. See Baldwin, Have Public Employees the Right to Strike? NAT'L MUNIc. REv. 515 (1941).

Yes, 30

70. ZsKIND, op. cit. supra note 57, passim; RHYNE, op. cit. supra note 64, at
35 et seq.
71. Note, 54 HARV. L. Rsv. 1360, 1365 (1941).
72. It has been suggested that where the disruption of a public service
causes particular inconvenience, even if not essential to health and safety,
there is public pressure to restore services; hence strikes should not be allowed
in such areas because it places the employee in too powerful a bargaining
position. Note, 55 COL. L. REV. 344, 362, n. 127 (1955). The premise is a
doubtful one since public pressure, particularly when influenced by the press,
may also turn against the employees' union. Thus, either side risks secondguessing the public.
73. The difficulty in making such a judgment which is so clearly of a policy
nature emphasizes that the judgment should not be made in the aftermath of
the heat engendered by a strike, but rather after an objective study of the
problem, undertaken under non-adversary conditions. It seems clear also that
the judgment is not one appropriate for the judiciary.
74. E.g., IND. ANN. STAT. §§ 40-2401 to 40-2415 (Burns 1947); FLA. STAT. ANN.
§§ 453.01-453.17 (Supp. 1947) (does not apply to utility owned and operated
by a governmental unit); ILL. ANN. STAT. § 50-111.65 (Brossard Supp. 1947)
(does not apply to state or any political subdivision).
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Manifestly, it is often difficult to ascertain in advance whether a
strike, even in essential services, will injure public health or safety
since the length of the strike and its scope will affect that determination. Thus, another approach that may be used in the case of public
utilities is to permit employees to strike but if the strike becomes too
serious, to allow the government to obtain a temporary injunction
or other relief. In effect, this is the procedure provided in the National
Labor Relations Act in the case of private employees.7 5 If coupled
with a procedure for resolving the disputes, whether through arbitration, mediation or other means,76 this is perhaps the most desirable
solution in this area and should be used both for private and public
employees engaged in essential services.
In the final analysis, it must be recognized that strikes stem from
the failure to adjust the problems which give rise to the strikes. Skillful handling of strikes is no substitute for the solution of disputes in
their incipiency. To the extent that the collective bargaining process
can be effectively employed, the right to strike may well become a
nominal one relatively unimportant in the public labor relations
problem.
(3) Collective Bargaining. In the absence of statutory authority,
most courts have held that the public administrator had no power
to enter into collective bargaining agreements. 77 The reasons have
varied. In some cases, the courts have felt that wages and other conditions of employment were exclusively matters of legislative concern
75. The National Labor Relation Act provides for example: "(a)

Upon

receiving a report from a board of inquiry the President may direct the
Attorney General to petition any district court of the United States having

jurisdiction of the parties to enjoin such strike or lock-out or the continuing
thereof, and if the court finds that such threatened or actual strike or lockout(i) affects an entire industry or a substantial part thereof engaged in
trade, commerce, transportation, transmission, or communication among
the several States or with foreign nations, or engaged in the production
of goods for commerce; and
(ii) if permitted to occur or to continue, will imperil the national health
or safety, it shall have jurisdiction to enjoin any such strike or lock-out,
or the continuing thereof, and to make such other orders as may be appropriate." 29 U.S.C.A. § 178 (1947).
76. State provisions have varied: e.g., MAss. ANN. LAWS c. 150 §§ 3-8 (Supp.
1954), (if governor finds interruption endangers health and safety, he can
require a moderator and arbitration or submission to an emergency board;
if not settled and emergency still exists, governor may seize and operate plant
and facility); Miss. ANN. STAT. §§ 295.010-295.210 (Vernon 1947) (applies to
utilities operating under governmental franchise or permit or under governmental ownership and control; if governor thinks strike threatens health and
welfare, he may seize plant; unlawful to strike after plant has been seized);
N.D. REv. CODE § 37-0106 (1943) (governor may seize public utility in event
of strike which endangers life and property).
77. See generally, RHYNE, LABOR UNIONS AND MUNICIPAL EMPLOYEE LAW - A
SUPPLEMENTARY REPORT 29-34 (1949). National and state labor acts generally
expressly exclude public employees or have been so construed; cases are
collected in Note, 55 COL. L. REV. 344, 349 (1955).
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and hence the administrator lacked the power to enter into collective
bargaining agreements.78 It is, of course, true that the administrator may not vary wages, classifications, or other conditions legislatively established. In practice, however, the legislature seldom
deals with all aspects of personnel administration. Even if the more
significant areas such as wages and position classification are excluded
from collective bargaining, there generally remains for administrative
determination, numerous aspects of personnel administration which
79
may form the subject for collective bargaining.
In other cases, the courts have said that an administrator may not
bargain collectively because that power was not expressly granted
to the city and the court was unwilling to imply the power as part of
the general powers of the city to contract. 80 The conclusion is a
doubtful one; certainly in view of the importance of labor relations
to any public agency, the power to handle labor problems by whatever
methods are currently acknowledged as desirable would seem to rank
high among the fairly implied powers. In some cases, the courts have
validated bargaining agreements by finding that a proprietary function was involved and reasoning (sometimes circuitously) that in such
instances, it may be implied that the government was intended to have
the same powers as a private corporation. 8 1
Where a home rule city is involved, the power to enter into collective bargaining agreements 82 as to most aspects of public employment would seem clear, since personnel administration is generally
recognized as a matter of municipal concern within the typical home
rule grant. 83 However, some aspects of labor relations, such as pension or disability compensation might be considered matters of statewide concern 84 and hence subject to general state law. As to such
matters, local collective bargaining agreements would have to yield if
inconsistent with state-wide provisions. But in the absence of conflict,
there would seem no reason why a home rule city could not bargain
78. Springfield v. Clouse, 356 Mo. 1239, 206 S.W.2d 539 (1947); Miami Water
Works Local No. 654 v. City of Miami, 157 Fla. 445, 26 So.2d 194 (1946).
79. Note, 54 HARv. L. REV. 1360, 1364 n. 42 (1941).
80. City of Cleveland v. Association, 30 Omo Op. 395 (1945); Miami Water
Works Local No. 265 v. City of Miami, 157 Fla. 445, 26 So.2d 194 (1946).
81. Christie v. Port of Olympia, 27 Wash. 2d 534, 179 P.2d 294 (1947); Local
266, I.B.E.W. v. Salt River Project Agricultural Improvement & Power Dist.,
78 Ariz. 30, 275 P.2d 393 (1954).
82. The agreement, of course, would be subject to the limitations of the
city's Home Rule Charter.
83. E.g., Lennox v. Clark, 372 Pa. 355, 93 A.2d 834 (1953); Goodwin v. Oklahoma City, 199 Okla. 26, 182 P.2d 762 (1947); State ex rel. Fischer v. City of
Lincoln, 137 Neb. 97, 288 N.W. 499 (1939). But cf. Hagerman v. City of Dayton,

147 Ohio St. 313, 71 N.E. 2d 246 (1946) where the court invalidated an ordinance providing for voluntary check-off of union dues. The decision is criticized in Fordham and Asher, Home RuZe Powers in Theory and Practice, 9
Omao ST. L.J. 18, 41 (1948).
84. Pension systems, for example, are frequently established on a statewide basis, as are workmen's compensation and occupational disease laws.
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collectively even on those subjects of personnel administration which
might be appropriate for state legislative action.
Even where the determination of wages and conditions of employment is a matter of administrative determination, 5 many courts have
held that it is an illegal delegation of the administrator's discretion
to enter into collective bargaining agreements, since it involves delegation to the union of the administrator's power to fix wages and
other conditions of employment. 86 The weakness in this reasoning
seems to be a factual one. The collective bargaining process does not
mean that the decision-making power has been delegated to the union.
The decision whether to enter into the agreement or not remains with
the administrator. If the administrator does have the authority to fix
wages and other conditions of employment, there seems to be no
reason why he may not select a collective bargaining process as the
means for arriving at his determination.
A variant of the delegation argument is that collective bargaining
constitutes a surrender or abdication of discretion. The argument here
is that the administrator normally may change his determinations.
If, however, he enters into collective bargaining agreement, he precludes such changes and thereby "abdicates" his continuing discretion.87 It has been suggested 88 as an answer to this contention that
administrators frequently enter into binding contracts and that the
making of a collective bargaining agreement is similar. But the answer
does not seem to lie in analogies to other contractual arrangements
such as in supply and construction operations, for there the "surrender
of discretion" is one necessarily intended by the legislature, while it
may well be that the grant of power to the administrator to make decisions on conditions of employment was intended to permit him to
exercise continuing discretion and not to preclude him from doing so
because of a collective bargaining agreement. The question, therefore,
is basically one of statutory intent. As an original question, if the
administrator has been delegated the powers to deal with conditions
of employment, his authority should also include the power to enter
into agreements within the budgetary period.
85. Under most comprehensive civil service schemes, wages, classification
and other conditions of employment are to be adopted as part of the Civil
Service Regulations, pursuant to broad guides legislatively established. See,
e.g., Philadelphia Home Rule Charter § 7-401.
86. Los Angeles v. Los Angeles Bldg. & Const. Trades Council, 94 Cal. App.
2d. 34, 210 P.2d 305 (1949)

(alternative holding); Mugford v. Mayor and City

Council of Baltimore, 185 Md. 266, 270; 44 A.2d 745, 747 (1945) ("The City haE
no right under the law to delegate its governing power to any agency");
Hagerman v. City of Dayton, 147 Ohio. St. 313, 71 N.E.2d 246 (1946).
87. Home Tel. and Tel. Co. v. City of Los Angeles, 211 U.S. 265 (1908);

Mugford v. Mayor and City Council of Baltimore, 185 Md. 266, 44 A.2d 745
(1945); City of Los Angeles v. Los Angeles Bldg. & Constr. Trades Council,
94 Cal. App. 2d 34, 210 P.2d 305 (1949); City of 'Cleveland v. Association, 30
Ohio Op. 395 (1948).
88. Note, 55 COL. L. REv. 344, 351 (1955).
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Philadelphia has sought to handle the problem in this way. Under
the Philadelphia Home Rule Charter, responsibility for all matters of
personnel administration is vested in the Personnel Director and the
Civil Service Commission. 89 The Personnel Director negotiates a collective bargaining agreement with the union recognized as the collective bargaining agent for public employees. During the negotiation
process, the Director consults with the Commission which makes suggestions. Nevertheless, the agreement that is finally concluded provides that it shall be subject to the City's Civil Service Regulations.
The Civil Service Commission then reviews the agreement, sending
it back for further negotiation and modification when it believes it
necessary, and then adopts the agreement as part of the Civil Service
Regulations. Since the agreement is subject to the Regulations, any
future change in the Regulations will have a superseding effect. Thus,
strictly speaking, the contract is merely an illusory one since it is not
binding on the Commission. As a practical matter, however, when an
agreement is finally reached and adopted by the Commission as part of
the Civil Service Regulations, it is not likely that the Commission will
depart from the terms of the agreement except under extraordinary
circumstances. To do so would not only adversely affect the morale of
city employees but would also jeopardize the course of future collective
bargaining. This working arrangement has been in effect for three
years and city and union officials agree wholeheartedly that it has
been a key factor in the harmonious labor relations the city enjoys,
with its employees.
Of course, the public agency that enters into collective bargaining
agreements will have problems not faced by private industry. Thus,
for example, even though a majority union is recognized as the exclusive bargaining agent for purposes of negotiating a collective bargaining agreement, it will probably be necessary to provide a procedure whereby minority views are also afforded a hearing. 90 Similarly,,
check-off privileges may have to be given to minority as well as the,
majority unions; 91 and the determination of the appropriate bargaining unit may be especially difficult in a complex public agency. How-ever, these and similar problems peculiar to the public agency are
89. §§ 7-100-7401 of the Philadelphia Home Rule Charter. Personnel matters are dealt with by civil service regulations which are proposed by the
personnel director and adopted by the Civil Service Commission.
90. It has been suggested that exclusive recognition discriminates against
non-union men and rival unions. See City of Cleveland v. Association, 30 Ohio,
Op. 395, 408 (1945); Mugford v. Mayor and City Council of Baltimore, 186
Md. 266, 270, 44 A.2d 745, 747 (1945); Note, 55 COL. L. REV. 344, 354-55 (1955);
Comment, 54 ILL. L. Rsv. 364, 372 (1950).
91. Compare Kirkpatrick v. Reid, 193 Misc. 702, 85 N.Y.S.2d 378 (Sup. Ct.
1948) and Mugford v. Mayor and City Council of Baltimore, supra note 90.
Philadelphia, for example, permits voluntary check-off for both majority and
minority unions. See OPINIONS OF THE CITY SOLICITOR OF PHILADELPHIA 175,
(1952).
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not insurmountable and undoubtedly various practical solutions will
be found by those agencies undertaking collective bargaining.
There can be little doubt that the values of collective bargaining are
present for the government employer as well as for the private one.
The desirable course for the future would seem to be for legislatures to
remove any obstacles to collective bargaining by public agencies and
indeed to establish positive machinery whereby it may be pursued.

